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**A REVIEW OF THE STRATEGY OF HISTORICAL EXPANSION OF THE REGIONAL**  
**COUNTRIES (ISRAEL, TURKEY, IRAN) SURROUNDING THE ARAB COUNTRIES**

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**ABSTRACT**

Many indicators show that regional countries such as Turkey, Iran and Israel continue their expansion in the Arab countries, and expansion has become part of their political and strategic doctrine to consolidate the regional influence of each of these countries. And that all indications indicate that the Middle East is still far from political and economic stability, and that the state of chaos and growing turmoil may herald bloodier and more severe conflicts, and the doors of the region remain open to more severe interventions. And that the region is witnessing the beginning of a more dangerous stage for the birth of regional axes based on major countries that have vital interests and economic ambitions.

**Keywords:** strategy, historical, expansion, surrounding the Arab, Israel, Turkey, Iran, middle east.

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

The strategies of 2021 are dominated by the features of a regional state that aims to expand influence, supported by significant transformations closely related to the upheavals that the world witnessed as a result of the Corona pandemic, and the consequent state of ambiguity and uncertainty about the future, especially what was related to the health and economic situation. It is expected that US foreign policy will witness a restructuring of its strategies towards the world and the Middle East in particular, adopting diplomacy as an alternative to military presence, efforts to return to the nuclear agreement with Iran and focusing on issues of democracy. As for Russia, it continues to consolidate its military involvement in the Middle East region and has strengthened its military presence in Syria and Libya through military companies, as well as strengthening its military presence in Sudan. Chinese policy in the Middle East is also witnessing a great difference, as it is becoming a superpower. China has increased its economic influence in the Middle East, and the United States is trying to rein in China's ambition but to no avail. The European Union continues its endeavors to achieve strategic policy in order to be able to defend its interests separately from American interests. In the shadow of these international interests come regional interests, which we identified with three regional countries, which are the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and Israel, and these countries have vital interests in the Arab countries. The Israeli in the Arab countries such as Palestine, Lebanon and Syria and future goals in normalization, and then the second axis, which included the Turkish expansion in Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Qatar, and then the third axis in which we touched on the Iranian expansion in Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen and how to influence political decisions.

**Israeli expansion in the Arab countries: (militarily, economically, politically)**

Israel has not drawn its borders yet because those borders are drawn against the background of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates, and today they are expanding towards the Arab lands since 1967 one after the other, whether they are in Palestine or in Syria and Sinai, which makes it a demilitarized zone, except on the condition that terrorism is fought with an Israeli agreement. Egyptian in defining what terrorism is, then it tried to establish a force for it in northern Iraq, and there are other Arab countries that (Israel) infiltrated softly through economy, trade, tourism, sports and art. Israel justifies its expansion because of the Iranian expansion in the region and that it wants to resist this expansion until it includes the Golan Heights with American recognition. The excuse was to resist the Iranian expansion in Syria and to protect the security of Israel. It occupies some Arab lands under the pretext of resisting this Iranian threat, and it is working to open the door to normalization with the Arab countries. Under the pretext of achieving peace, it also works to deliver messages to the Arabs that Iran is your enemy only, and also presents projects to the Arabs to open the door for itself later to economic and commercial hegemony after the US-backed military hegemony, which the West is keen on to be permanently superior in the region.

**Placing the Arabs between two options: Solidarity with Palestine or support for Israel against Iran**

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No one denies the escalation of Gulf fears of Iran's growing ambition in various fields, politically, militarily, and sectarian. Dr. Mustafa Al-Barghouti, former Secretary-General of the Palestinian National Initiative, said that we are facing an attempt to replace Iran as an enemy of the Arabs instead of Israel. Barghouti described it as a failed and wrong attempt, indicating that if there were differences between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, it must be resolved through peaceful means and constructive dialogue, "because the crisis between the Arabs and Israel is different," whether in terms of Israel's rejection of the rights of the Palestinian people, as well as its continuous attempts to dominate the Arab world.

Dr. Bashir Abdel-Fattah, a researcher at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, sees the matter from a different perspective, as he said during an interview with DW Arabia that "what is happening today is the result of others putting the strategic vision of the Arabs and imposing it on them, with the growing fears of an escalation of confrontation between Iran and Israel and the fear of As it moves outside the Syrian lands, the Arab countries face a dilemma: Will they show solidarity with Israel in confronting Iran, and is this consistent with their position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict [1]. With the political and military escalation taking place in the Middle East, the Arab countries found themselves in a dilemma. The Gulf states see Iran as either a strategic or religious threat, or their ambitions conflict with Tehran's aspirations to play larger roles in the regional scene. This vision means, in a way, moving in a wide range of political positions towards Israel, starting with turning a blind eye to what is happening between it and Iran on the soil of Syria and perhaps Lebanon as well, passing through some statements that may seem to express moderate positions, and ending with complete identification with the Israeli position, but These positions taken by many Arab countries regarding the crisis between Iran and Israel contradict their "supportive" positions on the Palestinian cause.

#### **Normalization with Israel:**

The journey of Arab normalization with Israel began at the end of the seventies of the last century, but it remained lukewarm, until 2020, during which 4 countries joined the train of normalization, some of which reached the point of alliance. The journey of Arab normalization with Israel began at the end of the seventies of the last century, but it remained lukewarm, until 2020 in it, 4 countries joined the normalization train, some of which reached the point of alliance. While Egyptian and Jordanian normalization remained within the narrowest limits, it was dominated by economic and security issues often imposed by geography. According to observers, Arab normalization came in 2020 during the era of former US President Donald Trump, either under US pressure (Sudan) or for the purpose of barter (Morocco). And there are those who have been printing secretly for years but found the opportunity to come out into the open or invoke the Iranian threat (UAE and Bahrain). While the Egyptian normalization was met with Arab rejection, which amounted to a boycott of Egypt and the transfer of the headquarters of the Arab League from it to Tunisia, the 2020 normalization was not rejected by most regimes, except for the Palestinians, who considered it "treason" and a "stab in the back." Although the normalization systems celebrate their agreements, the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs said in October 2020 that most of the Arab discourse on social media (90%) rejects the normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain. In the following lines, we review with you the printing countries and the most prominent forms of normalization and to which The extent to which the Arab street dealt with it.

#### ***Egypt. War and Geography (March 26, 1979 - Camp David Accords)***

Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar Sadat was the first Arab president to visit Israel publicly, in November 1977. On March 26, 1979, he signed a peace treaty with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the Camp David resort in Washington, DC, making Egypt the first country to print with Israel. Under the treaty, the two parties, who share a border of about 200 kilometers, declared an end to the state of war, Israel withdrew from Sinai, which it occupied in 1967, and Israeli ships obtained the right of free passage in the Suez Canal. The two sides also agreed to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations and to end the economic boycott. Nevertheless, most of the agreement did not penetrate the Egyptian consciousness and most of its institutions, and the media and the street did not help in passing it. Unions and most Egyptian parties also reject all forms of normalization and punish any of their affiliates if they participate in any normalization activities. Israel did not attract the Egyptian workforce, despite the abundance of money there. Despite decades of normalization, the data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018 indicate that the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and Israel amounted to only about \$149 million [2].

***Jordan... Jerusalem and the borders (October 1994 - Wadi Araba)***

By virtue of the geographical reality, Jordan found itself a neighbor of a country that took control in six days in 1967 of lands it ruled on the other bank of the river in the west, even before the declaration of normalization. 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordanian Prime Minister Abdu al-Salam al-Majali signed the "Wadi Araba" treaty, which guaranteed security for Israel on its longest border (about 360 km) and gave Jordan the right to supervise religious affairs in Jerusalem. In subsequent years, agreements were made to enter hundreds of Jordanian workers to Israel, as in 2016, an agreement was signed with Israel to import gas worth 10 billion dollars, which extends over a period of 15 years. At the popular level, the majority still rejects normalization and the economic agreements ensuing from it, as demonstrations were organized to express rejection positions, which Representatives in Parliament supported and in an indication of the popular rejection of normalization, according to the data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018, that the volume of trade exchange between Jordan and Israel did not exceed the barrier of 335 million dollars during the past year [3].

***The UAE... the normalization of allies (September 15, 2020 - the Abraham Accords)***

The UAE's contacts with Israel were not interrupted for at least a decade before the signing of the "Abraham" agreement at the White House, on September 15, 2020, and Emirati normalization took a different turn by covering most sectors and trying to popularize it, and unlike Jordan and Egypt, it did not stop at the narrow official, economic and security levels. Normalization affected all political, cultural, economic and technological sectors, and agreements were signed to operate flights and exempt from visas, in areas of investment, science and technology, taxes and others.

There have also been mutual visits of personalities at different levels, the most recent of which was the visit of the Emirati ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Al Khajah, in late May, to the spiritual leader of the religious "Shas" movement, Rabbi Shlomo Cohen, in the occupied Palestinian city of Jerusalem, and on March 12, 2021, she announced The UAE establishes a \$10 billion fund to support investment in Israel. And in my month inside Israel. It was agreed to launch programs for the exchange of student scholarships in the field of education, and to announce the opening of an Israeli economic office during the summer in Abu Dhabi.

Last April and May, agreements were signed in the fields of: artificial intelligence and big data solutions, gas, securities trading and the launch of an Arab-Hebrew media platform. According to data published by the Dubai government media office, in a statement, trade exchange with Israel amounted to about 272.3 One million dollars during the period from September 2020 to January 2021, no voices emerged from the Emirates rejecting normalization, but rather the media and communication networks tended to promote it and promote those who bless it, individuals and institutions, while a Palestinian official did not rule out the transformation of the relationship into a military alliance under the pretext of an Iranian threat [4].

***Bahrain (September 15, 2021-Abraham Agreement)***

The normalization agreement between Bahrain and Israel was signed in the White House garden on September 15, 2021, which Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa considered a "historic achievement", but that was preceded by mutual relations and visits, as Manama hosted, on June 25 and 26, 2019, a "workshop". Peace for Prosperity" in which Israelis participated, and it stemmed from the "deal of the century" that Trump intended to implement in the Middle East and nullifies the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. Meetings also took place between the Bahraini Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, and his Israeli counterpart, Israel Katz, in Washington. During July 2019, and here we can recall the statements of the Bahraini Foreign Minister in February 2019, before normalization, in which he said that confronting the Iranian threat is more important than the Palestinian issue. The normalization agreement dealt with aspects of investment, tourism, direct flights, security, communications, technology, energy and health care, Culture, the environment, and mutual opening of embassies. Nevertheless, the Bahraini street rejected the agreement, and groups were formed to reject normalization, and perhaps that was the reason that prompted the Israeli insurance company against foreign trade risks, to monitor 100 ml One dollar for exporters to Bahrain, in addition to \$200 million for exporters to Morocco, for risk insurance [4].

***Sudan... under temptation (October 23, 2020)***

During the era of the second democratic government (1965-1969), the boycott of Israel law culminated in the decisions of the Fourth Arab Summit Conference, which was held in Khartoum during the period August 29-September 1, 1967. Some researchers and politicians described the conference as a conference that “declared war against Israel”; Another group of them called it the Conference of Arab Resilience, or the three No's, "no peace, no recognition, and no negotiation with the Zionist enemy," while a third group preferred to describe it as the conference calling for removing the traces of Israeli aggression from the occupied Arab lands after the June 1967 war. The one who carefully examines the minutes and decisions of this conference realizes that those who described it as the “conference declaring war against Israel” started from a strategic-justification view. For Israel's position refusing to withdraw from Arab lands, with the aim of bartering the occupied land for peace and recognition of Israel's right to stay and use international waterways in the region. As for those who called it the Arab Resilience Conference, they contented themselves with looking at the three “No’s” that were employed to absorb the psychological and political crisis that resulted from the defeat of June 1967.

As for the opinion that described the conference as a call to remove the effects of the Israeli aggression on Arab lands, it relied on the assumptions promoted by the Egyptian press. To market the government's position on Security Council Resolution 242.

However, the outcome is that the Three No's Conference was a historical position for the Sudanese government, and a psychological and moral barrier that prevented it from establishing any political or diplomatic relations with Israel. However, this barrier, psychological and moral, did not exist in South Sudan; The armed movements sought the help of Israel to provide them with military and technical support during their war against the military government of Khartoum (1969-1985). This contact with Israel took another form, when President Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri (1969-1985) allowed, in the eighties of the twentieth century, the deportation of Ethiopian Falashas through Sudanese territory to Israel, in return for some financial rewards that were presented to the government of Sudan. On the other hand, we note that Israel was keen to create direct relations with Khartoum, or to interfere in Sudanese affairs by supporting the armed movements opposing the Khartoum government, within the framework of its policy aimed at "tightening the parties" to weaken the "Islamic" government of Khartoum (1989- 2019) with anti-Israel tendencies, or forcing it to normalize with it.

On October 23, 2020, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the transitional government had agreed to normalize relations with Israel. On the same day, the White House announced that Trump had informed Congress of his intention to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, on which it has been included since 1993, for hosting at that time the late leader of the "Al Qaeda" organization Osama bin Laden. The agreement provided for the start of economic and trade relations, with an initial focus on agriculture. It also stipulated subsequent meetings on cooperation agreements in those areas and other areas such as technology, agriculture, aviation and immigration issues. The agreement was met with widespread Sudanese popular rejection, as most Sudanese parties rejected it, and demanded that it be retracted [5].

#### ***Morocco... the Sahara in exchange for normalization (December 10, 2020)***

Morocco was the sixth Arab country to accept normalization, as King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced, on December 10, “the resumption of official bilateral contacts and diplomatic relations with Israel.” Israel, and it is signature in recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the disputed Sahara region with the “Polisario” front. The agreement includes the reopening of liaison offices in Tel Aviv and Rabat, which were closed in 2000 during the Palestinian uprising, and then the exchange of opening embassies in both countries, and the resumption of flights. Direct flights. During the same month, four agreements were signed between the two countries in the fields of economy, trade, tourism and aviation. Last March, Morocco announced the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between Moroccan and Israeli businessmen working in the private sector, to strengthen economic and trade relations. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the volume of trade exchange between Morocco and Israel has reached more than four million dollars a month in recent months, while the agreements seek to raise the figure to about \$500 million annually [6].

The Jewish Agency (the Commission for Encouraging Jews to Immigrate to Occupied Palestine) estimates the number of Jews in Morocco at about 2,000, while the number of Moroccan Jews in Israel is estimated at 600,000,

thousands of whom visit Morocco annually. However, the declaration of normalization was met with widespread popular rejection, which was expressed in demonstrations in dozens of Moroccan cities. It was also rejected by the most prominent Islamic parties and blocs in the country, led by the "Tawhid and Reform" movement, which represents the advocacy shield of the "Justice and Development Party" (leader of the government coalition).

#### **Exit from the Arab initiative**

The Palestinians consider normalization a departure from the Arab initiative (March 2002), which was launched by the late Saudi King, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, and adopted by the Beirut Arab Summit. The initiative offered complete peace with the Arab countries, on the condition of Israel's complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands in June 1967. including the Golan Heights, reaching a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 194, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital [7].

## **II. TURKISH EXPANSION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES**

Many indications show that Turkey intends to continue its expansion in the region and that this expansion has become part of its political and strategic doctrine to consolidate regional influence, under the Islamist-leaning government of the Justice and Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This paper sheds light on the incentives and drivers of the Turkish trend towards increasing regional expansion, the constraints and challenges facing it, and its possible future results and prospects. Over the past few years, Turkey has launched three military incursions into Syria, sent supplies and fighters to Libya, deployed its naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean to assert its claims about its rights in the region, expanded its military operations against the PKK militants in northern Iraq, and sent military reinforcements to the last strongholds. Finally, the Syrian opposition in Idlib provided military aid and Syrian mercenary elements to support Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia in order to restore the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey today has a direct military presence in Qatar, Somalia and Afghanistan, and peacekeeping forces in the Balkans and its global military presence is currently the largest since the days of the Ottoman Empire [8].

Turkey's reliance on military force to secure its interests is the cornerstone of its new foreign policy doctrine that has been developing since 2015. The new doctrine questions the feasibility of joint action with traditional regional and international powers, and pushes Turkey to act unilaterally when necessary. This new doctrine emerged from several international, regional and internal changes, the most important of which is. Recently, the overthrow of a dictatorial regime, from Iraq to Libya, in conjunction with the decline in the appetite of the United States to get involved in the affairs of the Middle East, created a vacuum that Iran and Turkey sought to fill and benefit from for their interests. This development, in turn, prompted the countries of the region to cooperate together through various means. It was previously thought impossible, or at the very least unnecessary. The Iranian threat contributed to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain overcoming their historically hostile stance towards Israel, which led to the signing of the "Abraham Accord" to normalize relations.

#### **Turkish expansion in Libya:**

Recently, international and regional concern has escalated over the growing Turkish interference in the Libyan crisis and its military battle, which has been announced by the political leadership in Ankara, more than ever. The developments of recent days, the significant changes that have occurred in the field situation, and Turkey's boasting of its control of Libyan military and strategic sites, the danger of which goes beyond the local sphere, to affect the interests of active players regionally and internationally, has steadily raised the level of this concern, and the demands to stop Ankara's excessive hand in extending its ally. In Tripoli, the Government of National Accord is armed with weapons and foreign fighters, which made Libya a candidate to be a hotbed of tension, a starting point for migrants heading towards Europe, and an attraction for extremist elements from all over the world, in the medium and long term [9].

With factors such as these, it was natural for them to raise concerns in Europe more than others, for fear of the geopolitical and security repercussions of the Libyan crisis on their countries, which the Turkish escalation contributes to strengthening, according to frequent official and press reports, recently issued in the old continent.

Not to mention that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened Europe with its greatest fears in the event of the fall of the "reconciliation" government when he warned of the eruption of a wave of illegal immigration from Libya. In an article for the American newspaper "Politico", he said that the fall of the "reconciliation agreement" means that Europe will face a new set of security threats, calling on the European Union to follow in its footsteps and support the Tripoli government [10].

The faltering of American policy in the region resulted in a decline in the American role in the region, giving a margin of movement to the regional powers to benefit from, and in this context, the Turkish moves with Syria, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia come to fill the void resulting from the attempts of the United States to grant these countries a stronger role in the region. The political cost of Turkish expansion in the region is much less than the political return: The economic gains that Turkey can obtain as a result of playing a regional role will be fully realized in the case of the Middle East [11].

At the end of the twentieth century, and on its basis, Samuel Huntington proposed what he called the stability gap, i.e. the demolition and destruction of everything that exists and then rebuilding it to serve the will of the actors, so America began to occupy Iraq and turned a blind eye to Iran in receiving it, and then the stage of Iranian expansion and war through proxy began, so the issue is no longer The only Palestinian for the Arabs, but it became the Iranian expansion that penetrated the borders of most Arab countries, and more dangerous than that, the Ottoman project joined it, so there became two dangers threatening the Arab region, in addition to the main Palestinian issue that the two parties invested in [12].

According to political realism, Saudi Arabia has followed the priority of confronting the Iranian expansion that threatens its national security, especially in Bahrain and Yemen, as well as on the borders of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. They penetrate into the Arab region in accordance with the realpolitik pursued by Saudi Arabia. Kissinger's vision of realpolitik, which sees that Israel has become a reality, and it did not expand in the Arab region, like Iran and Turkey [13].

#### **Turkish expansion in Lebanon:**

This is how Turkey has been beginning to feel the pulse, then infiltrate gradually so that it can master the threads of the game, just as happened in Libya through Misrata during the past years and in other Arab countries. Now, during the past months, the Turkish movement began in Lebanon, especially in the north, the area's readiest for Turkish embrace, where the majority are Sunni Muslims, in addition to the extreme poverty in Tripoli and Akkar. During the last period, there has been much talk about the Turkish role in the riots in Tripoli and Beirut, despite Ankara's denials. Of this news, and the absence of any statements from the Lebanese authorities about what is going on in the tongues, the talk about this role has become preoccupied with the minds of politicians in Lebanon, so the controversy remains, and the confusion remains about an old and renewed Turkish role. The tense Lebanese environment is always a factor of attraction for external parties. While Iran has settled in the south, Turkey will find a welcome in the north, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid attention to this, and began to intensify his visits to Lebanon, as the first visit to Lebanon was in 2007 when he began in the town of "Kawashra" in Akkar in northern Lebanon, which has a population of about 3,000 people who hold Lebanese citizenship, but they speak the Turkish language in addition to their Arabic language. The connection of its citizens with Turkey was severed after the Ottomans left Lebanon, but the Turks returned to remember it some time ago and extend a helping hand to the people of the town.

This visit was preceded by the entry of the Turkish forces as part of the UNIFIL forces to Lebanon, and the activity of the Turks began through the "TIKA" organization, or the "Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency" in Tripoli and Akkar, then Erdogan visited again in 2010, and thus the visits of officials did not stop. Turks from Lebanon. The talk about Turkish expansion in Lebanon was very much associated with Bahaa Hariri, the son of Rafik Hariri and the older brother of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, based on his relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and that he may be the link between the Turks and the Sunnis in Lebanon. The Turkish expansion has been felt by the leaders in Lebanon for some time. At the end of last August, Lebanese President Michel Aoun issued a tweet directed at Turkey, in which he said, "All attempts to liberate from the Ottoman yoke were met with violence, killing, and fueling sectarian strife. The state terrorism practiced by the

Ottomans On the Lebanese, especially during the First World War, claimed hundreds of thousands of victims between starvation, conscription and forced labor. In the same context: Elias Bou Saab, Minister of Defense in the former Lebanese government, said: "What came in Lebanese President Michel Aoun's speech regarding the Ottoman Empire, which he described as a "terrorist state," is a real matter that cannot be shirked from. go dr. Huda Rizk, a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Lebanese University, points out that the Turkish presence in northern Lebanon is not born these days, but rather dates back to 2013, based on the presence of Turks living in Lebanon called Al-Kawashra, which is the same name as the town in Akkar, and Turkey took care of these, giving them Her nationality is alongside the Lebanese nationality, and she established Turkish cultural centers for them as a reminder of their origins. At the same time, it was able to attract "fundamentalist" Islamists in northern Lebanon, and other Islamists belonging to various organizations, many of whom are supportive of the Turkish role, and even believe in Turkey's leadership of the Islamic world [14].

**Turkish expansion in northern Iraq:**

The statements of a Turkish official to Reuters, on Thursday, regarding Turkey's intention to build more temporary military bases in northern Iraq, after it intensified its strikes targeting Kurdish fighters there, raised several questions about the map of the Turkish violation of Iraqi lands, and the nature of the ambitions of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan regime in the Arab country, the official. Al-Turki revealed that the Turkish plan aims at what he called the establishment of temporary bases in the region "to prevent the cleared areas from being used for the same purpose again." 10 kilometers, near the border area of Batufa, belonging to the town of Zakho, in the far north of Dohuk Governorate. The Turkish ground incursion was preceded by intense air and artillery bombardment of 8 border villages in the Haftinin area near the mountainous strip separating Iraq and Turkey, which caused the displacement of families from the villages, and material losses to the farmers' fields in those villages. The Turkish Ministry of Defense had previously announced that The incursion came after a series of raids deep in the territory of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, taking place within the framework of the so-called "Claw of the Tiger" operations, which target sites attributed to the Kurdistan Workers Party [14]. Turkey maintains more than 10 temporary bases that already exist in northern Iraq, while Ankara seeks to establish more of them with the justification of its war against Kurdish fighters. The areas of deployment of Turkish bases in the Kurdistan region of Iraq extend along the borders, starting from the Khabour crossing to the Soran area. In 2014, with the emergence of ISIS, Turkey established bases in Bashiqa, Soran, and Qalaat Golan, in addition to its bases in Erbil, including military headquarters near the Qandil Mountains. The establishment of more military bases and an increase in the number of soldiers and forces in northern Iraq flows in one direction: What Turkey claims are its strategic interests, foremost of which is confronting the Kurdish expansion in Iraq and Syria, and the defeat of the PKK is a long-term goal that Turkey says it has been seeking to achieve for a long time, but observers believe that Ankara is looking beyond weakening the Kurdish fighters, which is Dedicating the Turkish presence in Iraq, a scenario that seems identical to what is happening in Syria, and what may happen in Libya [15].

**Turkish expansion in Syria:**

The world has come to deal with the Turkish presence in Syria as a fait accompli, and Turkey has become part of the solution through the understandings (Sochi and Astana) instead of pressuring it to leave Syria in the context of providing the conditions for the success of a political solution that is capable of steadfastness, and it can be said that Erdogan succeeded in managing the game In Syria by building mutually beneficial relations with Russia and the United States, and benefited from walking on the ropes between the two adversaries, who view Turkey as a card to help them achieve their gains, and not as a united party to international law, and in turn it employs the relationship of disharmony and rapprochement with the two parties as a card to recognize its military presence. directly on Syrian territory. The retired Russian general, Sergei Chvarkov, considered that Turkey entered areas in northern Syria to stay there forever, and that it is currently forming autonomous areas loyal to it in northwestern and northeastern Syria. The irony is that the United States, Israel and Russia have entered into secret and public understandings to put pressure on Iran and expel it from Syria by systematically targeting the Iranian presence and the Lebanese Hezbollah concentrations and preventing it from obtaining weapons, while no one is targeting the Turkish presence, and it is clear that Turkey benefits from vacuums in the balances The international community in Syria and elsewhere, in the absence of a pressing international position calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Syria, including the Russian forces whose presence is widely seen as legitimate, and the same is true for the stationing of US forces in the oil and gas areas in northeastern Syria.

### **III. IRANIAN EXPANSION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES**

There is no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the largest culturally, linguistically and ethnically independent regions in the Middle East, which made it have many determinants in foreign policy. It is certain that it directs certain policies towards the Arab world in general. The Gulf states in particular, and Iran is always trying to reflect a positive image of the world and presents themselves as the first defender of Islam with the appearance of moderation in front of the unjust Jews and Christians.

#### **The Revolutionary Guard**

The leadership of the Iranian revolution established a new militarized political thought to ensure loyalty to the Supreme Leader, which is the Revolutionary Guard, and since the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, it worked to consolidate the idea of making the Revolutionary Guard as an iron fence, and that one of the functions of that Revolutionary Guard is to protect political and religious figures outside the borders of the state and work to export the revolution To neighboring Arab and Islamic countries, which takes its orders directly from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and although Iran had international weight in conventional armament, the revolution and the first Gulf War proved that the Iranian army system must be reformulated as one of the most prominent decisions of the revolution, and the arming of Iran Restore and modernize its naval arsenal, ground and air defenses, and nuclear development [16].

#### **The distinguished geographical location of the State of Iran**

Iran is one of the major countries regionally, as it enjoys enormous natural resources and resources. Iran occupies a distinct regional location that combines South and West Asia and common borders with the former Soviet Union, Turkey, Iraq and the Gulf of Oman in addition to the Arabian Gulf, in addition to the expansion of its area, which gave it strategic directions with about 8 countries as borders. Shared land, and bordering the Caspian Sea with Kazakhstan and Russia, and in the Persian Gulf with Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman. All of this is one of the advantages of the Iranian region that gave it weight as a determinant of its foreign policy.

#### **Iranian political regimes controlling its domestic and foreign policy**

The first of these systems, which has religious, political and strategic importance, is the institution of the guardian or guide, followed by the Committee of Experts and the Guardian of the Constitution, who in turn has the authority to control all matters pertaining to the state, including political, economic and military. In it is foreign policy, and among his powers is to dismiss the president, pardon, overturn judgments, general command of the armed forces, and order a referendum or settle any disputes between the authorities.

#### **Exporting thought and the Iranian revolution**

And as Mr. Ruhollah Khomeini stated upon his arrival in Tehran in February 1979, we will export our revolution to the whole world so that everyone knows why we launched the revolution. Our goal was independence in the sense of liberation from restrictions and dependence on the East and West and freedom. Our revolution must be exported to all parts of the world. Do not misunderstand that we want to open countries. The meaning of exporting the revolution is for all peoples and governments to wake up. This is how Ayatollah formulated the new Iranian ideology. Iran, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, saw the occupation of Iraq and the collapse of its state by the United States, the international coalition, as a historic opportunity for it to build a buffer belt that would distance its lands from any future attack from the West, similar to what happened in the bitter years 1980-1988. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Iranians, and from the first weeks of the entry of the American forces into Iraqi territory, hastened to send their Iraqi supporters first, and then the Iranian security and military experts, who made a decisive contribution at a time when the Iranian political arms were working tirelessly to ensure the large political presence of their loyalists in the apparatus. The Iraqi state is to be rebuilt.

On the other hand, the absence of an Arab strategy left a number of countries alone in the face of Iranian pressure. Iranian influence has spread in the institutions of countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, not at the level of guaranteeing political loyalty, but rather the clear influence in most political decisions by the allied parties. The Iranian security presence in these countries has become a foregone conclusion, while full political control is



progressing rapidly. Toward perfection, and all that expansion by means of one tool which is the creed. Also, the idea that the Iranian tide will remain confined to the Shiite sect in the region and will not cross to other sects, due to the impediment of belief among Sunnis or Christians towards Iranian propaganda, but its inaccuracy has been proven. The Iraqi and Lebanese experiences say that the Iranian policy equipped with diplomacy is capable of jumping over the sectarian wall. The temptation of the “alliance of minorities” attracted Christians first, and they joined the “axis of resistance” in Lebanon and Syria, then they were joined by segments of the Sunni community that preferred to establish relations of cooperation and loyalty rather than enduring Iranian pressure. Especially since the Arabs did not seem qualified to enter the arena of competition with Iran in the Lebanese, Iraqi and Syrian arenas [17].

### **Iranian expansion in the Gulf states**

The geopolitical and strategic situation has changed in the region extending from the shores of Lebanon on the Mediterranean Sea to the shores of Yemen on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, and from the occupied Golan to the length of the coasts of the Arabian Gulf, including, of course, the Iraqi-Iranian borders, in favor of the growing Iranian power, whether in terms of ideology or in terms of influence. Security and mobilization for all countries within this vital field, regardless of the size of their independence and the strength of their governments [18]. And all this expansion was by the weapon of the (Shia) creed.

Many centers differed in the percentage of Shiites in Saudi Arabia. We take the most popular one that the percentage of Shiites in Saudi Arabia is 10%, which was dealt with by the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in its first annual report issued in 1993. The center also proposed that the percentage of Shiites in Bahrain 70% and in Iraq 65%. The shortcomings of the strategic thinking of the countries of the region - specifically the countries of the Arab Gulf - makes the issue of Iranian expansion a source of great controversy among the peoples of the region, especially at a time when organizations loyal to Iran have become an influential factor in the policy of the countries we mentioned, while the Gulf countries were focusing on a more dangerous factor. An expansion that I considered more dangerous than the Iranian expansion and with Turkish efforts, which is the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood, which brought down some countries such as Tunisia and Libya. Then the direction of the compass was the Gulf countries, as some theorists in the Gulf countries believe that the non-interference of the Gulf countries to oppose Iran in Iraq was caused by fear that it would support Sunni Forces Later on, it appears linked in one way or another to the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is certain that the historic visit of US President Donald Trump to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on May 20, 2017 established a new beginning and a major change in the strategic approach of US foreign policy towards the Middle East, whose principles or repercussions cannot be extrapolated in isolation from an in-depth analysis of the contents of the political discourses of this region. President during his election campaign, and this visit is also of strategic importance for both sides, because it is the decisive moment that removed the United States of America from the role of passive observer of events in the region (President Obama's policy) and strengthened the regional role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in combating terrorism and curtailing Iranian expansion.

It is not difficult to conclude that US foreign policy, as the most important success of Washington and the control of its influence globally, is in a state of confusion and conflict in strategies towards the Arab region, not because of the rush of events and the variety of challenges and forms of conflict, or the fall of friendly regimes after the outbreak of the revolutions of what is known as the Arab Spring, but also As a result of the impasse, the emergence of armed groups and the Iranian expansion in the Arab countries has become one of the variables of engineering the features of international politics, and then the imbalance of power due to the interference of these actors in the international political scene, in exchange for the decline in the role of countries such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, has changed to a large extent from the traditions of American foreign policy [19].

Then Saudi Arabia realized the new reality since the Americans got involved in the secret negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear file, and Saudi Arabia was not convinced by the assurances sent by the United States and the West confirming that the nuclear agreement with the 5 + 1 group does not mean giving the green light to Iran, but rather the United States confirms Its position rejects Iranian expansion in the region. Saudi Arabia confused Obama's policy of balance, which was followed by President Nixon in the seventies to maintain a balance that protects the security of the Gulf, but it was disturbed after Mr. Khomeini came to power, and Obama wants Riyadh

and Tehran to reach an understanding in order to reposition him. And the withdrawal to Asia and the Pacific to confront the greatest danger is China, but the diplomatic crisis that erupted between Saudi Arabia and Iran resulting from the execution of Ayatollah al-Nimr represents one of the manifestations of the worsening geopolitical rift in the region for Obama, as that crisis forces the United States to rearrange the cards in the region. Among them are major files, on top of which is the Syrian crisis, which has become a major concern in light of the failure of the parties and the main players in this issue to reach Z solutions. The conflict evolved into a direct or semi-direct confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. American writer Holly Elite published an article on the American CNBC website, in which she says that Saudi Arabia is confronting Iran seeking to occupy its influence in the Arab countries, and the largest of these confrontations is in Yemen because the Houthis are now engaged in a battle for control. The country and in direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, but they are expanding the circle of conflict by targeting Saudi lands with Iranian missiles and drones, which made Saudi Arabia return to rearranging its cards with Iraq, Lebanon and other Arab countries, in an attempt to relieve the pressure of Iranian expansion [20-22].

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Within the framework of the formation of major international axes, and the involvement of more parties in them, an important question appears about the role of state parties, especially the United States, Russia, China and Europe, which are expected to play an important role in economic domination of the Middle East. And that most of those parties are trying to maintain vital relations with the conflicting regional countries, and at the same time benefit from their disputes, which seek to expand at the expense of what makes the Arab countries vulnerable to more severe conflicts in the near future, and that this is supported by international interventions whose aim is control and control, leaving diplomacy solutions and settlement. This may expose the region to more economic collapses, and it also caused a large population migration, without a clear horizon for stability in the region, which has been exhausted by wars and conflicts for decades the ongoing conflict between regional states aims to expand and is based on the faith through which those states expand.

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